2015 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

4-13-2015

Michael Taccetta v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015

Recommended Citation
"Michael Taccetta v. Federal Bureau of Prisons" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 370.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/370

This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 14-3254
_____________
MICHAEL TACCETTA,
Appellant
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-04439)
District Judge: Honorable Faith S. Hochberg
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
February 13, 2015
______________
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: April 13, 2015)
_____________
OPINION*
_____________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.

VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
In 1994, Appellant Michael Taccetta pleaded guilty to organized-crime-related
felonies in both state and federal court, and received lengthy concurrent sentences.
Taccetta now argues that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) erred by refusing to credit a period
of pre-sentencing detention against his federal sentence. The District Court, noting that
the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC) had already credited the time
against Taccetta’s concurrent state sentence, concluded that the BOP had properly
calculated Taccetta’s federal sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).1 We will affirm.
I.
Taccetta, a member of an organized-crime syndicate in New Jersey, was arrested
in January 1993 by federal authorities, charged with offenses under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68, and released on bail
the same day. In August 1993, while still out on bail, he was arrested by New Jersey
state authorities for violations of state law and held without bail. On September 20, 1993,
the federal government obtained a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, which
allowed federal agents to “borrow” Taccetta for his guilty plea in federal court that same
day.
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18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) provides that, in certain circumstances, an inmate shall
receive credit against his federal sentence for “any time he has spent in official detention
prior to the date the sentence commences” unless that time has been “credited against
another sentence.”
2

Pursuant to the writ, Taccetta remained in federal custody for his next several
court proceedings, including when he pleaded guilty in state court on October 19, 2003
and when a federal court sentenced him to 300 months’ incarceration on July 22, 1994.
The parties agree that under customary writ practice, Taccetta should have been returned
to state custody, at the latest, immediately after his federal sentencing. For reasons
unknown, however, Taccetta remained in federal custody. He was again produced for
state-court sentencing on August 10, 1994, where he received a 40-year concurrent
sentence. From 1994 to 1999, Taccetta served his concurrent sentences in federal prison.
In 1999, BOP officials reviewed Taccetta’s sentence and realized that Taccetta had
never been returned to New Jersey custody on the writ ad prosequendum. The BOP
contacted the NJDOC, which agreed that Taccetta should have been returned to state
custody after his federal sentencing. In January 2000, Taccetta was transferred to state
custody.
It later became apparent that due to various state credits, Taccetta’s 40-year state
sentence would expire at least two years before his concurrent 300-month federal
sentence. This meant that Taccetta would eventually be required to return to federal
prison, where his projected release date was (and remains) April 26, 2016. Taccetta thus
became concerned about which sovereign was crediting him for the 305 days he spent
incarcerated between his federal guilty plea on September 20, 1993 and his federal
sentencing on July 22, 1994: if the term were credited against only his state sentence, he
would receive no tangible benefit, because the credit would simply hasten his transfer to
3

federal prison; if it were credited against both sentences or against his federal sentence
alone, his total time of incarceration would be reduced by approximately 305 days.
In 2011, Taccetta’s attorneys contacted the BOP about this issue. The BOP
responded that the NJDOC had already credited the time against Taccetta’s state
sentence, and the federal prohibition on double-counting in 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)
prohibited the BOP from also crediting the same period against Taccetta’s federal
sentence. In response, Taccetta filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The
District Court concluded that the BOP had not abused its discretion with respect to the
sentencing calculations and denied Taccetta’s habeas petition. In early 2014, the NJDOC
determined that Taccetta had completed his state sentence, and he was transferred back to
federal prison to serve the two years remaining on his federal sentence.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).
Our review of the District Court’s legal conclusions underlying a denial of habeas
relief is de novo. Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Vega v.
United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007)). The BOP’s view of § 3585, as
expressed through an interpretative rule, is entitled to “‘some deference’ so long as it sets
forth a permissible construction of the statute.” Blood v. Bledsoe, 648 F.3d 203, 208 (3d
Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995)).
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III.
Where a defendant faces prosecution by both state and federal authorities, the
“primary custody” doctrine determines where and how the defendant will serve any
resulting sentence of incarceration. The basic principle is that the first sovereign to arrest
the defendant is entitled to have the defendant serve that sovereign’s sentence before one
imposed by another sovereign. See Bowman v. Wilson, 672 F.2d 1145, 1153 (3d Cir.
1982). A sovereign can “relinquish” primary custody by releasing the defendant on bail,
dismissing the charges, or granting parole. See United States v. Cole, 416 F.3d 894, 897
(8th Cir. 2005). We have explicitly recognized, however, that temporary transfer of a
prisoner pursuant to a writ ad prosequendum does not constitute a relinquishment. Rios
v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 274–75 (3d Cir. 2000) (collecting cases), superseded on other
grounds, see United States v. Saintville, 218 F.3d 246, 249 (3d Cir. 2000).
Here, the federal government obtained primary custody of Taccetta by arresting
him in January 1993, but relinquished custody by releasing him on bail. New Jersey then
gained primary custody by arresting Taccetta in August 1993, and retained primary
custody because he was not released on bail. The subsequent transfer of Taccetta to the
custody of the federal government on a writ ad prosequendum did not result in a
relinquishment of New Jersey’s primary custody.
Taccetta first argues that he should receive federal credit for the period at issue,
rather than state credit, because the record reflects an intent by New Jersey to relinquish
primary custody to the federal government from September 20, 1993 onward. As
5

evidence of that intent, Taccetta cites the fact that the parties negotiated a global plea
agreement; that he was in federal custody at the time of his state-court plea and
sentencing; and that he served six years in federal prison before being returned to the
physical custody of New Jersey.
The record is unambiguous, however, that New Jersey never expressly waived
primary custody, thus distinguishing this case from Shumate v. United States, 893 F.
Supp. 137, 142–43 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that local authorities relinquished primary
custody by signing express waiver). And Taccetta points to no case in which we have
recognized a tacit or implied relinquishment of primary custody. In fact, quite to the
contrary, we have held that “the length of time in federal detention” is irrelevant to the
question of relinquishment. Rios, 201 F.3d at 274. We thus conclude that Taccetta was
in the primary custody of New Jersey throughout the period at issue; that the BOP was
entitled to respect the NJDOC’s decision to credit that time against Taccetta’s state
sentence; and that the BOP was then prohibited under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) from also
crediting that time against Taccetta’s federal sentence.
Taccetta’s second argument is that we should extend the reach of Willis v. United
States, 438 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), and Kayfez v. Gasele, 993 F.2d 1288
(7th Cir. 1993), which approved narrow exceptions to the rule against “double-counting”
in 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). Those rules are now applied nationwide by way of BOP Program
Statement 5880.28, which provides that a federal prisoner can receive credit from both
sovereigns for a particular stretch of incarceration under a narrow set of circumstances
6

involving the “effective full term” (EFT) of each sentence. See BOP Program Statement
5880.28, at 1–14 (defining an ‘EFT’ as the full sentence length without including any
potential time credits). The Willis rule applies only if: (1) the state and federal sentences
are concurrent; and (2) the state EFT is equal to or shorter than the federal EFT. Id. at 1–
22 through 1–22A. The Kayfez rule applies only if: (1) the state and federal sentences are
concurrent, (2) the state EFT is greater than the federal EFT; and (3) the state EFT, after
application of qualified presentence time, is reduced to a date that is earlier than the
federal EFT. Id. at 1–22B through 1–23A. The purpose of both rules is to address
scenarios where a credit against a concurrent state sentence “would not benefit [the
defendant] except that . . . he would be serving only one sentence instead of two
concurrent ones. Crediting [the disputed period] against his federal sentence will correct
the problem.” Kayfez, 993 F.2d at 1290.
In this case, Taccetta’s state EFT (40 years) was greater than his federal EFT (300
months). Thus, the reasoning of Willis is not applicable and Taccetta is not entitled to
any benefit under Program Statement 5880.28. Even after the subtraction of the 305 days
of presentence time at issue, his state EFT still results in an expected release date roughly
14 years later than his federal EFT, thus ruling out Kayfez. While acknowledging that he
does not fall within the ratio decidendi of either Willis or Kayfez, Taccetta argues that the
holdings of these cases should be extended to cover his situation: his actual maximum
release date on his state sentence occurred sooner than his maximum release date on his
federal sentence, and thus he received no benefit from his credit for time served.
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But, as the BOP has interpreted § 3585(b), credit towards a term of imprisonment
is calculated not based on the actual length of the sentence but on the effective full term.
As noted in Kayfez, the BOP’s decision to use effective full terms for purposes of
implementing § 3585(b) was a policy adopted for “administrative convenience” because
“[t]o do otherwise would require the Bureau in all similar cases to consider the
complexities and details of rules which vary from state to state[.]” Kayfez, 993 F.2d at
1290. The Kayfez court expressly concluded that “the Bureau’s exclusive reliance on the
full term is reasonable.” Id. Taccetta provides no case law to the contrary, and we see no
other reason to revisit or reject this widely accepted standard. Accordingly, we will not
grant relief on this basis.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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